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In 2009, Iranian people came to the streets in opposition to suspected elections 
manipulation that led to the victory of the conservative presidential candidate Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad over his reformist challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi. Throughout this wave 
of protests, the protesters could not rely on Iranian domestic media or the internet. 
Filtering, censorship and technological manipulation made mass communication very 
difficult. However, Iranians were left with an alternative option, namely the foreign-based 
Persian news channels – these had less limitations and easier accessibility. As a result, 
and contrary to the international view of the protest movement as a “Twitter Revolution,” 
this article argues that the foreign-based channels took advantage of the situation. By 
offering protesters a more transparent and open platform, they also achieved the strategic 
goal of trust building with audiences in Iran.  
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Introduction 
The ubiquitous presence of the mass media nowadays has turned it into an important tool 
in shaping public opinion and political movements. The public use the media as a platform 
to amplify their claims and the media attend to social movements because they create 
newsworthy events. Todd Gittlin, one of the prominent writers on the relationship 
between the media and social movements has referred to this relationship as being one of 
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mutual dependency (Viegenhart, 2012: 2). Accordingly, in order to evaluate the amount 
of impact a certain media organisation can have on a social movement in terms of 
mobilization and the shaping of public opinion, factors such as accessibility and 
trustworthiness require attention. While normally people tend to believe a medium with 
which they share similar political views, this article argues that such mutual dependency 
requires the presence of both of the aforementioned factors. 
The Iranian Green Movement of 2009 is a unique case in this regard for two 
reasons. Firstly, the movement is internationally dubbed as a “Twitter Revolution,”2 a 
term that has been applied to it mostly by those who were following the protests from 
outside the country. This article aims to challenge this term by claiming that while the 
crucial role of Twitter in helping people circumvent restrictions on communication 
throughout demonstrations is undeniable, Twitter has by no means served as a 
revolutionary tool for the people within Iran. Secondly, although the availability of 
broadcasting networks in a variety of languages is nothing new, the increasing number of 
foreign-based Farsi-speaking media organisations, available via satellite TV, and their 
uncensored coverage turned them into an important actor throughout the Green 
Movement. 
As a result, the article starts out by challenging the term “Twitter Revolution”, and 
why it is not appropriately used for the Iranian protests of 2009. It continues by comparing 
the effectiveness of Iranian domestic media and the foreign-based channels, concluding 
that the latter is likely to be the most influential, both in terms of accessibility and 
trustworthiness. 
 
Social media and the possibility of a Twitter revolution 
During the course of the Green Movement, social media played a crucial role in informing 
people worldwide and in coordinating the public’s movements within Iran. Through 
different social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, many gained access directly to the 
public-generated contents. However, it did not take long until the Iranian government 
became sensitive of the extensive use of the internet by opposition supporters. 
Consequently, the Iranian Ministry of Communication reduced the internet speed to less 
                                                          
2 The term was applied by foreign news agencies such as Washington Post, NY Times, Reuters and many 
more. Some examples are offered here: 
http://blogs.reuters.com/mediafile/2009/06/19/twitter-revolution-in-iran-aided-by-old-media-tv-radio/; 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/06/17/DI2009061702232.html (both 
accessed on 15 April 2017). 




than 128 kilobytes per seconds to make uploading any pictures or videos of street protests 
impossible (Opennet Report, 2013: 283). This reduction was followed by the filtering of 
certain websites, including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The high level of limitations 
and the strict monitoring of the internet by the Iranian government and the Cyber Police 
decreased the efficiency of the internet in comparison to other types of media that were 
available at the time. It is important to mention that an unspecified number of people 
surpassed the regime’s control over the internet by using anti-proxies and filter-breakers, 
but even if one thinks of this number as very high, the very low speed of the internet, 
specifically for the websites that required fast broadband access, clearly reduced their 
efficiency.4 
As a result, it is safe to state that “Twitter revolution” is not a familiar term for 
those who were in Iran at the time of the outbreak of the 2009 Green Movement. Golnaz 
Esfandiari, an Iranian journalist, challenged usage of this term by referring to it as a “story 
that wrote itself.” In an article written for Foreign Policy, she focuses on the exaggerated 
role of Twitter during the Green Movement, mostly by Iranian diaspora groups in the US 
and Europe alongside foreign governments (Esfandiari, 2010). Moreover, many active 
Twitter users in Iran point out that Twitter, unlike Facebook, is still not a commonly used 
social media within Iran, let alone the main opposition tool during the 2009 
demonstrations. An article in The Guardian further pointed out that in solidarity with the 
Iranian protesters, many Twitter users across the world switched their location to Tehran 
during the 2009 protests (Weaver, 2010). Hamid Tehrani, the editor of the blogging 
network Global Voices claimed that “The west was focused not on the Iranian people but 
on the role of western technology. Twitter was important in publicizing what was 
happening, but its role was overemphasized” (quoted in Weaver, 2010). 
By comparing the availability and usage of social media throughout the Iranian 
Green Movement and the 2013 Turkish Gezi Park protests5, more light may be shed on 
the overstated role of Twitter in Iran. It should be noted that the majority of protesters in 
both countries were urban, educated and belonging to the middle class – the segment of 
society that would generally provide the highest percentage of internet users in any 
country.  
                                                          
3 Opennet Initiative (ONI) is a joint project with the goal of monitoring and reporting on internet filtering 
and surveillance practices by nations. 
4 Due to the sensitive nature of this, there is understandably no data on the exact number of people who had 
access to anti-filters.  
5 The Gezi protests were famous for the important role of social media in public mobilization. 




In 2013, almost 50% of the Turkish population were active users of the internet 
(Yanatma, 2016). In the same year, according to Semiocast6 global analysis of social 
media users, Turkey was ranked #7 in terms of Facebook users and #11 in terms of having 
the most users of Twitter. Nevertheless, during the Iranian protests, only 10% of the 
Iranian population had access to internet.7 Due to filtering, there is no official estimate on 
the number of Iranians within the country who were either active Facebook or Twitter 
users – however, in a poll conducted by Iran web in late 2009, respondents claimed that 
the main social media they use is Facebook and not Twitter.8 Therefore, a simple analysis 
of the number of internet users in the two courtiers leads us towards the conclusion that, 
in contrast with Turkey’s experience, Twitter has not been a major contributor to the 
formation of public protests in Iran. 
Mehdi Jami, an Iranian journalist, blogger and filmmaker, claimed in an interview 
with Tehran Review that “whatever the Green Movement has, it owes it to the media” 
(Mohtadi, 2011). Therefore a question arises in relation to the main media platform of the 
protesters. As mentioned above, the Iranian government took a number of steps toward 
tightening its grip on the internet – and yet they proved incapable of preventing the 
demonstrations. Hence, in the absence of well-functioning internet connectivity and an 
independent media, how did the Iranian people coordinate several protests? What stood 
as a platform for the continuity of their demonstrations? In order to answer these 
questions, the article will examine two distinguished groups of media that were accessible 
to Iranians at that time: Iranian domestic media and the foreign-based Farsi-speaking 
satellite television channels.  
 
Iranian domestic media 
In Iran, constitutional provisions and laws set restrictions on content that can be offered 
by the media. Iranian domestic media is generally known for its lack of transparency and 
the limitations imposed on it by the government. Article 175 of the Iranian constitution 
guarantees the freedom of expression, as long as it is in line with Islamic criteria and 
serving the best interests of the country (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran). In 
other words, the freedom of expression is guaranteed as long as certain red lines are not 
                                                          
6 Semiocast is a market and opinion research company providing social media intelligence consumer 
insights, social media KPIs and social media solutions. 
7 Percentage provided by Internet Live Stats. 
8 The accuracy of such polls cannot be guaranteed, due to the fact that many people would avoid confirming 
their usage of any kind of social media in Iran under government’s restrictions. 




crossed. However, the main issue here is that there is no clear definition for these red 
lines, and therefore it is very difficult to foresee the threshold of the government’s 
interests. 
Starting with newspapers, they routinely face threats of closure by Iranian state 
authorities. The tough state control has turned the issue of continuity (of being published) 
into a dominant concern of newspapers. The restricted freedom for journalists and fear of 
imprisonment also explain the limited coverage offered by newspapers. The low rank of 
Iran in the Word Press Freedom Index9 further illustrates the tough conditions in which 
Iranian newspapers need to function. 
The main pillar of the Iranian media, however, is IRIB, or the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Broadcasting. IRIB is owned by the state and is directly supervised by the Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who has the legal authority of appointing and dismissing 
the head of the IRIB on a periodic basis. Being a huge organization with several national 
and international television channels broadcasted in 27 languages (IRIB), IRIB is 
normally controlled by the conservative forces who have their political views directly 
reflected in IRIB productions. As a result, IRIB has never served as a transparent source 
of information for many. This statement gained more credibility when a confidential IRIB 
report was leaked during the 2009 protests. This report criticized the performance of IRIB 
and regarded its poor performance as a contributing factor to the widespread protests and 
the eventual engagement of the Iranian public with foreign television channels.  
By addressing the IRIB managers, the report summarized the main reasons behind 
the failure of IRIB to be as such: (1) the creation of doubt among public with the speedy 
announcement of the results of the presidential election, (2) refusing to offer any airtime 
to the opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi while celebrating the 
victory of Ahmadinejad, and (3) failing to cover the public demonstrations that were 
constantly being covered by international media (IRIB Psychopathology Report, 2009: 
3). A noteworthy example here would be the death of Neda Agha-Soltan, an Iranian girl 
whose sudden death on Tehran’s streets became the symbol of the Iranian anti-
government protests. Her death, captured on a cellphone camera, went viral in a matter 
of hours, but Iranian domestic media only briefly discussed her death and later speculated 
about the fabrication of the video on various occasions (The Death Of Neda, the Other 
Side of the Coin, 2011). 
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By going back to Gittlin’s idea of mutual dependency, it can be concluded that the 
Iranian protesters and the domestic media have not been mutually dependent on each 
other. In fact, it can be argued that none of them could serve the other’s interests. In a 
nutshell, the nontransparent information and the lack of proper coverage of the protests 
discouraged people from solely relying on IRIB to get information about the ongoing 
political turmoil in the country.  
The points mentioned above lead us to conclude that the growing pervasiveness 
of the Farsi-speaking foreign media outlets during the protests was not exclusively due to 
the popularity of these channels, but to the decreasing trust of the Iranians in their 
domestic media. This was an issue the foreign governments were fully aware of, and 
therefore a significant amount of money was poured into the development of the foreign-
based Farsi channels such as BBC and VOA by their host countries (Ash, 2009). 
 
Satellite TV 
In Iran, satellite TV has always been banned as part of the resistance against a “cultural 
onslaught” that was theorized by conservative forces in the 1990s (Azizi, 2014: 30). 
However, data shows that an estimated 68% of all the Iranian households have had illegal 
satellite receivers in 2009 (Vengar, 2016: 68), which is 6 times more than the number of 
internet users. It was therefore not unexpected that with all the limitations imposed on 
Iranian domestic media, the foreign-based outlets gained pivotal importance for the 
citizens. 
Another point that put these channels one step ahead was the inability of the 
Iranian government to stand as a serious obstacle to their activities. These channels could 
neither be shut down nor filtered. The only effective measure that was taken towards them 
by the Iranian authorities was jamming (Ash, 2009), which these channels circumvented 
by increasing the number of satellites carrying their signals. 
However, it is important to mention that not all of the Farsi speaking channels 
based outside Iran are included in this analysis. Many of these channels only produce 
low-budget entertainment programs which normally have a very low viewership. The 
channels this article concentrates on are the Farsi-speaking services of large broadcasting 
agencies such as the BBC – funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of 
the British government- and the Voice of America – funded by the government of the 
United States. These have been highly viewed throughout the protests.  
According to Rob Beynon, acting manager of BBC foreign correspondents in 




London, one in five people who have had access to satellite TV in Iran tuned in to BBC 
Farsi in the first month of its launch. Moreover, this channel received 300,000 linking 
blog articles and half a million searches on Google, all in a month following the start of 
its activity (Burns, 2009). While there is no exact data on the viewership of VOA Farsi, 
its popularity could be measured by the public reactions to its programs. An example 
would be Parazit, dubbed as the “Iranian Daily Show”, which was a satire political show 
broadcast on Friday nights on VOA Farsi. Parazit was regarded by many as the main 
platform for the young voices of the Green Movement. The show gradually drew global 
attention and its two hosts appeared on several other networks to discuss Iran and the 
ongoing conflicts. Parazit was estimated to have had millions of viewers in Iran and 
gathered nearly 1 million likes on Facebook. The influence of the show’s anti-
Ahmadinejad rhetoric was such that Iranian officials accused the channel of being 
affiliated with the CIA (Garda, 2011). 
These channels offered exactly what Iranian domestic media was not providing 
for the citizens. They were supporting or highlighting issues that the domestic media did 
not have the power to raise (Mohtadi, 2011). Phone-in discussion programs provided an 
opportunity for the Iranian people to communicate internationally and to address the 
public directly. Programs such as BBC’s “Nobate Shoma”10 is one amongst many. These 
networks were also actively involved in providing anti-proxies to Iranians via email, to 
help them circumvent the Iranian censorship infrastructure (Opennet Initiative, 2013). As 
a result, not only did these channels play a major role in supporting the protesters, but 
they were occasionally used as a tool for coordinating purposes as well. The younger 
generation’s coordinated practice of chanting “Allaho Akbar” from rooftops at nights is 
an example of acts that were advertised by Persian media abroad. 
In addition, these channels offered close analysis of the political protests across 
the country. Former political figures appeared on different programs and shared their 
views on given matters. Many of these people were former political activists whose voice 
had a direct influence on the protesters. Ahmad Batebi, an Iranian political activist in 
exile and Abolhassan Banisadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic are examples 
in this regard.  
In return, the contents of these channels and their visuals drew heavily on audience 
contribution. None of these channels were legally allowed to have a bureau in Iran, and 
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other agencies were threatened with having their licenses revoked in case of cooperation 
with these channels or sharing footage from them. For example, Mohammad Hossein 
Saffar Harrandi, the Culture Minister of Iran in 2009 claimed that even the BBC’s base 
in Tehran will be confronted if it produces any reports for the Farsi-speaking service 
(RSF, 2011). This situation led to the rapid growth of citizen journalism under the slogan 
of “each citizen a medium.” In the absence of correspondents on the ground, people acted 
as the main sources of information for these channels. Despite the interference and 
journalistic restrictions, the Iranian public played a significant role in by-passing 
censorship in general (Opennet initiative, 2013: 4). They voluntarily used their cell 
phones as a tool to film whenever a demonstration took place. In other words, these 
channels were collecting the news from Iran and broadcasted it back to the country. The 
Iranian citizens welcomed this two-sided relationship and gladly obliged to promote their 
own versions of the events in exchange for an open media and advanced technologies. 
Accordingly, while the government ban of the satellites makes reaching 
quantitative data to support the article’s main argument difficult, it can be stated that the 
symbiotic relationship between the protesters in Iran and the Farsi-speaking foreign-based 
channels was stronger than the one with the domestic media.  
Inevitably, these channels were also accused of having a negative impact on the 
political unrest. Bias, propaganda, and engaging people in “virtual” political activity (i.e. 
diverting such activity to cyberspace) are some of the issues that these networks were 
blamed for. Furthermore, many argued that these channels only followed the strategic 
goals of the states they were funded by, i.e. the United States and the United Kingdom in 
this case. They were referred to as the West’s tools of a psychological warfare and a 
mouthpiece of world-guzzling capitalism (Voss, 2015: 554). Furthermore, they might 
have focused on the protests as much as they were to increase their audiences. They were 
so fixated in promoting the anti-government demonstrations that sometimes they ignored 
the reasoning, ideology and demands behind the protests. Another criticism referred to 
the presence of the Iranian diaspora, with its different political standings, in connection 
to these channels (Lanzillo, 2011). 
Consequently, irrespective of the motives of these television channels during the 
protests, to a certain extent they managed to remove the cloud of suspicion that always 
existed around foreign media. By offering more transparency, the least they did was to 
let audiences choose the type of information they were willing to take in, an option that 
was not provided to them by any other type of mass media at the time. 






The Iranian Green Movement provided an opportunity for the Farsi-speaking foreign-
based channels to increase their viewership and credibility in Iranian society. Tough state 
censorship and increased internet restrictions following the protests gave Iranians an 
incentive to shift more towards Persian channels abroad. However, these channels were 
not licensed to cover the Iranian demonstrations on the ground, and, therefore, had it not 
been for citizens’ voluntary reporting on the protests, they would not have had much 
coverage to share. The result of these constraints was the formation of a symbiotic 
relationship, which made the Iranian public and the foreign media dependent on each 
other. While these channels never proved to be consistent and committed solely to the 
mission of the media of informing people, they played a crucial role throughout the 
protests. It is reasonable to assume that at least some of these channels may have been 
acting in accordance to whatever framework was provided to them by their host countries, 
just as it is reasonable to assess that they had considerable impact on the public’s 
mobilization and opinion. 
At the time of writing this (Spring 2017), people in Iran trust neither the domestic 
media, nor the Farsi-speaking channels abroad. However, the viewership of the foreign-
based channels has increased and they have managed to achieve greater acceptance within 
Iran. 
Thus, to conclude with, in describing what happened in Iran in the wake of the 
2009 presidential elections, the term “Satellite Revolution” should probably be preferred 
to “Twitter Revolution.” 
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